Following recent developments, HMRC will soon have access to information on many cryptoasset holdings, and is taking the opportunity to issue a reminder that these need to be reported as part of taxable estates.

HMRC recently sent a letter to professionals who have previously submitted Inheritance Tax returns, reminding them that cryptoassets are subject to Inheritance Tax (IHT). The letter instructs recipients to check whether estates include cryptoassets, and to make sure they are reported to HMRC as part of a return. Where submitted returns have failed to mention a cryptoasset belonging to the deceased, HMRC point out that this must be amended.
Under the rules that apply to deaths since 6 April 2025, IHT is charged on all assets of a person who dies as a Long Term Resident of the UK, which means they have spent at least 10 of the last 20 years as a UK tax resident. (A year of residence for these purposes is determined by the UK’s Statutory Residence Test.) Those who are not Long Term Residents will only be subject to IHT on their assets located in the UK.
Of course, this rule is not so straightforward to apply to decentralised cryptoassets, which can’t really be said to have a ‘location’ in any meaningful sense. There are various different arguments that can be made for how their legal location can be identified in English law. HMRC have advanced their own theory (albeit one without much legal basis or support from professionals or academics) that this is based on the residence of the beneficial owner of the cryptoasset.
This can lead to some surprising results. Imagine an Italian with cryptoassets held by a Swiss custodian, who decides to spend a few years in the UK. She has been advised that her foreign assets are not subject to IHT until she has spent at least 10 years in the UK, and so assumes that her cryptoassets are currently exempt from IHT. However, if she dies two years after arriving in the UK, HMRC would take the view that because she was UK resident, the cryptoassets are UK assets, and therefore subject to IHT. Of course, had she been properly advised, our Italian cryptoholder would ideally have undertaken pre-arrival planning to mitigate this potential exposure to IHT.
At first glance, it is not obvious what has prompted this reminder from HMRC, since the law on this point has not changed. As HMRC point out, while there is no specific reference to cryptoassets in IHT legislation, the wording in the Inheritance Tax Act 1985 is certainly broad enough to apply to cryptoassets.
Perhaps the reason for this letter is the introduction at the start of this year of the Crypto-Asset Reporting Framework (CARF) in many jurisdictions, including the UK. The CARF is an international agreement for information sharing, similar in some ways to the Common Reporting Standard (CRS). The idea behind the CARF is that cryptoasset service providers (such as exchanges, for example) will be obliged to identify their customers and collect certain information about their activities (for example, sales and purchases of cryptoassets) so that this can be shared with the tax authorities wherever the customer is resident.
This additional transparency may bring unwelcome surprises for those who have either assumed that they did not have to pay tax on cryptoassets, or believed HMRC would never find out. If the CARF data suggests a person had been selling cryptoassets at a gain, and they failed to report that gain to HMRC, it is likely that HMRC will have further questions. Similarly, if HMRC knows from CARF that a person was investing in cryptoassets, and their personal representatives submit an IHT account that fails to disclose these, we expect that HMRC will get in touch.
Of course, it’s one thing to know that cryptoassets need to be declared for IHT purposes, and quite another for personal representatives to know whether a deceased person owned them, or indeed find out the quantities and types of token that were owned. If the deceased did not leave accessible records, it may be difficult if not impossible to identify their cryptoassets. It’s easy to imagine that in many cases, a CARF-prompted enquiry from HMRC might be the first clue many personal representatives may have that there are cryptoassets in an estate.
Even where a deceased’s cryptoassets can be identified, that does not mean that personal representatives will be able to realise their value. For cryptoassets held in the deceased’s own custody (rather than, for example, held by an exchange or other custodian), the personal representatives will not be able to make a sale or transfer unless they can discover the private keys. This does lead to the possibility of a worst-case scenario where the personal representatives and HMRC know that there are cryptoassets in the estate, and HMRC are asking for tax, but the assets cannot be sold to pay it.
This illustrates well the importance of succession planning for those with cryptoassets. A Will by itself is not enough; you also need to ensure you have a system in place for your personal representatives to be able to identify your assets and also access the necessary private keys. This is a complex topic, and there are a variety of different solutions that might be appropriate in different circumstances, but the Private Wealth and Tax team at Quastels is well-qualified to be able to advise.
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What makes the Kanye West, now Ye, and Wireless story worth examining is not simply the controversy surrounding the artist, nor the legal mechanism deployed by the Home Office. It is the way the two came together. A suitability decision, framed in the familiar language of whether a person’s presence is conducive to the public good, became the point at which politics, reputation, commerce and culture converged. The result was not merely an immigration outcome. It was the effective unravelling of a major festival.
The basic facts are now well known. Ye was due to headline all three nights of Wireless in London in July 2026. Political pressure followed quickly. Sponsors began to step away. Ministers were said to be reviewing his ability to travel. By early April, it was being reported that the Home Office had blocked his entry to the United Kingdom and that the festival had been cancelled, with refunds to follow. The explanation given publicly rested on one of immigration law’s more recognisable formulations: his presence was said not to be conducive to the public good. Reports also suggested that an ETA had first been granted and was later withdrawn.
Outside immigration law, that phrase is often treated as if it were little more than a slogan. In legal terms, it is anything but. It reflects a longstanding and a deliberately broad power over admission to the United Kingdom. Under Appendix Electronic Travel Authorisation, an ETA must be refused or cancelled where the decision maker concludes that a person’s presence would not be conducive to the public good, by reference to conduct, character or associations. An ETA, importantly, is not permission to enter. It is permission to travel and seek entry.
The structure is therefore less fixed than is often assumed. A person may hold an ETA and still never set foot in Britain. Permission to travel may be withdrawn. Permission to enter may still be refused. The underlying assessment is not limited to criminal convictions or formally established wrongdoing. It is broader, and more evaluative, by design.
Seen in that light, the Ye case is not legally unusual. It is a straightforward application of an established principle. The Home Office was not being asked to adjudicate on artistic merit, provocation or the place of controversy in cultural production. The question was simpler. Was the public record of this individual’s conduct such that the state was entitled to conclude that his admission to the United Kingdom would be undesirable. On the reporting, the question was answered in the affirmative. The conduct associated publicly with that conclusion includes antisemitic statements, praise of Hitler, Nazi themed material and a broader pattern of behaviour over time. Whatever view one takes of him as an artist, those are matters which fall squarely within the scope of a non-conducive assessment.
What transformed the decision into something more significant was timing. This was not a refusal issued before any commercial commitments had been made. Wireless had already been built around him. Tickets were being prepared. Sponsors were already reacting. Public criticism had intensified. By the time the immigration question crystallised, it had become the hinge on which the entire event turned. Border control was no longer operating in the background. It became the mechanism through which the project itself fell away.
That carries an obvious lesson for promoters, venues and sponsors. Immigration risk is too often treated as an operational detail to be resolved late in the process. For individuals whose public profile carries clear reputation volatility, that approach is unsustainable. A performer may be commercially compelling, contractually secured and central to an event’s identity, yet still be vulnerable to exclusion on suitability grounds. Where that risk exists, a travel authorisation offers limited reassurance. Under the ETA framework, if the relevant threshold is met, refusal or cancellation follows.
It is equally telling to consider what the Home Office did not need to establish. It did not need to show that Ye intended to commit a criminal offence in the United Kingdom. It did not need to demonstrate that the audience would become disorderly. It did not need to resolve debates about free speech or artistic licence. The power operates at a different level. Once the decision maker concludes that a person’s presence is undesirable, the Rules provide the route. What appears dramatic in cultural terms is, in legal terms, a conventional use of executive authority.
That does not place the power beyond scrutiny. The formulation “not conducive to the public good” is intentionally broad. It allows room for judgment, and therefore for inconsistency. The state values that breadth because it enables intervention before harm is said to materialise. The difficulty, familiar to public lawyers, is that a broad standard depends on disciplined and even handed application. High profile cases bring that tension into view. The external pressure is visible. The internal reasoning rarely is.
Even so, on the facts as reported, this is not an especially difficult decision for the Home Office to defend. The conduct in question is neither obscure nor marginal. The controversy was already acute and public. Sponsors were withdrawing. Political concern had become explicit. Calls for exclusion had been made openly. Once the matter reached ministerial attention, the likelihood of a non-conducive outcome was evident. The case is notable not because it stretches the Rules, but because it shows how readily those Rules can carry consequences far beyond the border itself.
The more technical question, and the one that follows naturally, is how such a decison might be challenged.
Refusal of cancellation of an ETA is not necessarily the end of the matter. It does not, in itself, amount to the refusal of permission to enter. It closes one route and requires the individual to pursue another. The immediate step would ordinarily be a substantive entry clearance application, supported by detailed representations addressing the suitability concerns directly. That would not remove the underlying issue, but it would require the Home Office to consider the case within a fuller evidential framework.
Public law challenge is also available in principle. A decision which is irrational, procedurally unfair, based on a material error of fact, or taken without regard to relevant evidence may be open to challenge. In practice, the margin afforded to the Secretary of State in cases framed around the public good is likely to be wide, particularly where broader societal considerations are said to arise. That does not render such decisions immune. It does, however, set a high threshold.
A more difficult route would involve demonstrating genuine and credible change. Where the assessment turns on conduct and character, evidence of rehabilitation may carry weight in principle. In practice, it would need to be substantial. A bare assertion of regret is unlikely to suffice, particularly where the public record is extensive. Any attempt to revisit the decision would need to show that the conduct relied upon should no longer be treated as an accurate reflection of present suitability.
Whether any of these routes would succeed is uncertain. On the reporting so far, the decision appears legally robust. The more lasting point lies elsewhere. Immigration control is not simply a technical system governing entry. In certain cases, it becomes a mechanism through which the state exerts influence over the wider cultural and commercial environment. Ye has long operated on the premise that controversy is inseparable from the performance. Immigration law does not engage with that premise. It is concerned with consequence. Once conduct reaches the point at which it engages suitability, the question is no longer how the performance is received, but whether it is permitted to arrive at all.
In that sense, the Wireless episode is not simply about one artist or one decision. It is an illustration of something more structural. Border control, when it is exercised at the edge of controversy, does not merely regulate movement. It can determine what is able to take place around that movement.
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A Global Talent refusal should never be approached in the abstract. In most cases, there is no general right of appeal. The correct response depends on what has actually been refused, and at what stage. If the refusal arose at the endorsement stage, the relevant mechanism is usually endorsement review. If it arose at visa stage, extension stage, or settlement stage, the relevant mechanism is usually administrative review. In a significant number of cases, however, the more effective course is neither of those things, but a fresh application built on a stronger legal and evidential footing.
That distinction matters because the Global Talent route is structurally unusual. For most applicants, it is a 2-stage route. The applicant first seeks endorsement, unless they qualify through an eligible prestigious prize, and only then moves to the visa application itself. The Rules also make clear that Global Talent is a route to settlement, and that prize-based applicants can proceed without an endorsement application.
The practical consequence is straightforward. Before asking whether a refusal can be challenged, it is necessary to identify precisely which decision has been made. That is where the legal analysis begins, and it is often where poor advice begins to unravel.
If you have received a Global Talent refusal, the first question is not whether the decision was unfair. The first question is whether the refusal stage 1 endorsement refusal or a stage 2 immigration refusal. A stage 1 refusal usually points to endorsement review. A stage 2 usually points to administrative review. Neither mechanism is a general rehearing on the merits, and neither should be treated as a substitute for a properly prepared application.
In practice, Global Talent refusals usually fall into 3 categories. The first is refusal of endorsement at stage 1. The second is refusal of entry clearance or permission to stay at stage 2, including prize-based applications which proceed directly to the immigration application. The third is refusal of extension or settlement on the route. Appendix Global Talent confirms that refusals under the route, including settlement refusals and dependent refusals, attract administrative review. The endorsement material separately establishes the review process for unsuccessful stage 1 endorsement decisions.
That means the label “Global Talent refusal” is legally incomplete. Two applicants may both say they have been refused, but their remedies may be entirely different. Any serious challenge strategy begins with the refusal notice itself.
As a general rule, no. The Rules provide for administrative review where an application on the Global Talent route is refused, and the Home Office endorsement review guidance separately provides a non-statutory review process for unsuccessful stage 1 endorsement decisions. The published endorsement review guidance expressly says that endorsement review is a non-statutory scheme, and that is only available for a Global Talent endorsement application.
For that reason, articles or advisers who suggest that a Global Talent refusal can simply be “appealed” are usually eliding important distinctions. The better question is which review mechanism exists, what that mechanism actually examines, and whether the case is genuinely suitable for it.
Endorsement review applies to unsuccessful stage 1 endorsement decisions. The guidance states that the request must be made within 28 calendar days from the date of the receipt of the refusal email. The review is free of charge, and the policy explains that it is intended for cases where an applicant believes an incorrect decision has been made, for example because a piece of evidence appears not to have been considered.
Just as importantly, the Home Office material explains what the endorsement review is meant to do. It is not best understood as a full re-run of the endorsement case. The Home Office only examines the original application to confirm that the correct procedures were followed when deciding it. The reviewer checks that documents were correctly passed to the endorsing body and that the correct processes were used. The applicant must not resubmit information and is not able to provide new evidence as part of the review.
The guidance also contains an important procedural nuance. If the endorsing body maintains the refusal but with revised or fresh reasons, a further endorsement review request may be made, but only in relation to those fresh reasons. That safeguard is useful, but it does not create an open-ended right to keep rearguing the same case.
Administrative review is the route identified in the Rules where an application on the Global Talent route is refused, including settlement applications and dependent applications under the route. Appendix Administrative Review defines administrative review as the review of an eligible decision to decide whether the decision was wrong due to a caseworking error. The reviewer considers whether the original decision maker failed to apply, or incorrectly applied, the relevant Immigration Rules or published guidance.
That definition is critical. Administrative review is not an opportunity to present a better case on a different basis. The Rules state that the reviewer is not an opportunity to present a better case on a different basis. The Rules state that the reviewer will consider whether the applicant was entitled on the basis of the original application and will not consider whether the applicant was entitled on any other basis. In other words, the mechanism is aimed at caseworking error, not at rescuing a case that was inadequately evidenced or strategically weak from the outset.
The deadlines are short and should be treated as urgent. For endorsement review, the relevant guidance gives 28 calendar days from the receipt of the refusal email, although late requests may still be considered where there are exceptional circumstances. For administrative review, Appendix Administrative Review sets the time limit at 28 calendar days for refusal of entry clearance, 14 calendar days for refusal of permission to stay where the applicant is not detained, and 7 calendar days where the refusal or cancellation decision was made while the person was detained under the Immigration Acts. The Rules also provide a limited discretion to accept an out-of-time administrative review where it would be unjust not to waive the time limit and the application was made as soon as reasonably practicable.
The point is not merely procedural. In Global Talent matters, delay often distorts strategy. It shortens the window for proper review of the refusal, increases the pressure to take the first available step rather than the right one, and can compromise wider immigration planning where leave is expiring or relocation plans are time-sensitive.
This is often the decisive strategic issue. Appendix Administrative Review states that the reviewer considers entitlement on the basis of the original application, and only permits consideration of evidence not before the original decision maker in limited categories set out in the Rules, including certain false representation or deception decisions, some previous breach cases, specified document requests under the former evidential flexibility rule, and failures to follow the published evidential flexibility policy. Those categories do not turn administrative review into a general vehicle for rebulding a weak application with better documents after refusal.
That does not mean new evidence is irrelevant to the overall case strategy. It means that administrative review is usually the wrong forum for relying on it. If the refusal reveals that the application was not strong enough on the evidence originally submitted, a carefully reconstructed fresh application may be the more effective route. In Global Talent work, that is often the true dividing line between a challenge worth making and a challenge that merely consumes time.
At endorsement stage, the position is also narrower than many applicants expect. The Home Office guidance states that the applicant must not resubmit information and is not able to provide new evidence as part of the review. If the applicant believes the case would succeed with additional evidence, the guidance says they should make a new stage 1 endorsement application with the appropriate fee.
This is usually the most important question, and it is the one many applicants ask too late. Some refusals disclose a clear reviewable error. Others reveal a more fundamental problem, namely that the application never properly established exceptional talent, exceptional promise, route-specific eligibility, or evidential coherence in the first place. The Rules and guidance define the review mechanisms, but they do not relieve applicants of the need to make a strategic judgment about whether the original case can realistically be defended on the material already submitted.
In practice, a fresh application is often the better route where the original evidence was technically compliant but substantively unconvincing, where recommendation letters were generic, where the portfolio lacked discipline alignment to the relevant criteria, or where the case theory was simply not framed with sufficient precision. In those circumstances, insisting on review can become an expensive form of denial. A stronger application, built properly, is often the more commercially sensible answer.
The Home Office caseworker guidance states that applicants relying on endorsement may submit their stage 2 application before stage 1 is concluded, for example because their permission is nearing expiry. If that happens, the stage 2 application is to be held pending the stage 1 decision. The same guidance states that if no corresponding stage 1 application is submitted within 14 calendar days, the stage 2 application should be rejected because a valid endorsement is a validity requirement. That is a procedural point with real consequences for applicants working close to the edge of their immigration timeline.
It follows that refusal strategy cannot be detached from sequencing. In some cases, the immediate legal mechanism is only part of the issue. The wider question is whether the applicant’s current leave, travel plans, professional commitments, or settlement strategy require a more carefully managed response.
The first mistake is assuming that every refusal can be “appealed”. The second is treating endorsement review as though it were a full reconsideration of the entire case. The third is pursuing administrative review where the problem is not caseworking error but a fundamentally underprepared application. The fourth is missing the deadline while trying to decide which argument sounds strongest. The fifth is failing to read the refusal with enough discipline to separate procedural unfairness from evidential weakness.
The strongest refusals work is not usually the loudest. It is the most exact. It identifies the stage of refusal, the legal mechanism engaged, the error that is actually capable of review, and the point at which a fresh application is more likely to achieve the client’s wider objective.
At Quastels, we are highly experienced in advising on refused Global Talent matters and in determining, with precision, whether the correct course is endorsement review, administrative review, or a strategically stronger fresh application. We have had success in overturning refusals in this area through carefully structured, formidable representations that move beyond broad assertions of merit and instead confront the refusal on its legal, evidential, and analytical weaknesses. That includes successfully overturning a digital technology refusal, where the case required a disciplined reworking of how the applicant’s standing, contribution, and the future trajectory were presented against the relevant criteria, and also overturning an Arts Council refusal, where the decisive work lay in exposing the deficiencies in the original assessment and reframing the applicant’s profile, recognition, and supporting material with much greater precision. In both cases, the result did not come from repetition or advocacy in general terms. It came from understanding exactly where the refusal was vulnerable, exactly how the evidence should be marshalled, and exactly how to put forward representations of sufficient force, depth, and technical quality to give the applicant the best prospect of success.
A Global Talent refusal is rarely just a technical immigration setback. For many applicants, it sits within a wider plan involving UK relocation, family arrangements, research activity, business growth, or long-term residence. That is why the correct question is not simply, “Can this refusal be challenged?” The better question is, “What is the right procedural and strategic response to this refusal, in light of the evidence already submitted and the wider objective now in play?”
In some cases, the answer will be endorsement review. In others, administrative review. In many, a fresh application. The key is to make that decision quickly and correctly, before time is lost pursuing the wrong remedy.
A Global Talent refusal can sometimes be challenged successfully, but only where the challenge is matched to the decision actually made. Stage 1 non-endorsement decisions usually engage endorsement review within 28 days. Refusals of the immigration application itself, including settlement refusals, usually engage administrative review under Appendix Administrative Review. Neither mechanism should be mistaken for a general appeal, and neither is a substitute for a strong original application.
For serious applicants, the central issue is often not whether a refusal feels wrong, but whether it is legally reviewable on the existing material, or whether the better course is to rebuild the case properly and apply again. That is where good judgment matters most.
As a general rule, the relevant mechanisms are endorsement review for stage 1 non-endorsement decisions and administrative review for refusals under the Global Talent route itself. The published endorsement review guidance describes that process as a non-statutory scheme, and Appendix Global Talent states that refusals under the route attract administrative review.
For endorsement review, the guidance gives 28 calendar days from the refusal email. For administrative review, the Rules give 28 calendar days for entry clearance refusals, 14 calendar days for most in-country refusals where the applicant is not detained, and 7 calendar days where the person was detained when the refusal or cancellation decision was made.
Endorsement review applies to unsuccessful stage 1 endorsement decisions and focuses on whether the correct process was followed and whether the original material was properly handled. Administrative review applies to eligible refusals under the route and asks whether the decision was wrong because the original decision maker failed to apply, or incorrectly applied, the Rules or published guidance.
Usually not. Appendix Administrative Review states that the reviewer considers entitlement on the basis of the original application, and only considers evidence not before the original decision maker in limited categories set out in the Rules.
Yes. Where the refusal reflects evidential weakness, poor alignment to the relevant criteria, or a badly structured application rather than a genuine reviewable error, a fresh application is often the more effective route. That is a strategic judgment, but it follows directly from the limited scope of both endorsement review and administrative review.
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